Friday, July 29, 2005

WSJ: Currency Wars

By RONALD I. MCKINNON July 29, 2005
[Mr. McKinnon, a professor of economics at Stanford, is the author, most recently, of "Exchange Rates under the East Asian Dollar Standard: Living with Conflicted Virtue" (MIT Press, 2005).]

In 1839, the first Opium War began when Chinese customs officials at Canton destroyed a large quantity of opium that British merchants were trying to smuggle into China in order to buy tea and silks. British gunboats were sent in to force the opening not only of Canton, but several more northern Chinese ports on the Yangtze river -- the most important being Shanghai. Hong Kong was ceded entirely to Britain as a Crown Colony. Several desultory wars and skirmishes later led to the Treaty of Tianjin in 1858, when China was forced to open 11 more treaty ports to foreigners -- including Americans, French and Russians -- to accept foreign goods and to legalize the importation of opium.
On July 21, 2005, China again gave in to concerted foreign pressure -- some of it no doubt well intentioned -- to give up the fixed exchange rate it had held and grown into over the course of a decade. Congress had threatened to pass (and may still do so) a bill that would impose an import tariff of 27.5% on Chinese imports unless the renminbi was appreciated, and had pressured the Bush administration to retain China's legal status as a "centrally planned" economy (despite its wide open character) so that other trade sanctions -- such as anti-dumping duties -- could be more easily imposed.
A decade ago, when negotiations over China's entry into the WTO began, a raft of Wall Street banks, investment banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions subsequently pressured the U.S. Treasury to require China to loosen its capital controls and gradually permit the entry of foreign firms into China's domestic financial markets -- even though these financial conditions were not required of other WTO member countries. China is complying with these terms, as well as eliminating tariffs and quotas on imports beyond what was required by the WTO agreement.
While (uncertain) currency appreciation or the premature dismantling of capital controls on currency inflows and outflows are not as malign as an opium plague, the danger to China's heretofore robust economic growth and great success in lifting large numbers of people out of abject poverty should not be underestimated.
By holding the exchange rate of 8.28 yuan to the dollar constant for almost 10 years, and building monetary policy around this anchor, China's rate of inflation in its CPI has converged to that in the U.S., at a low level of about 2% per year. In part because other East Asian countries (except Japan) were also more or less pegged to the dollar in a region where almost all trade is invoiced in dollars, the fixed dollar exchange rate was a very successful anchor for China's monetary policy. This collective dollar pegging within East Asia also ensured exchange stability and price-level alignment, which allowed regional trade and investment to grow rapidly and efficiently. Under the fixed rate, China's own high GDP and productivity growth were particularly impressive.
However, on July 21, the renminbi was appreciated by 2% -- a small amount in and of itself -- while a narrow band of 0.3% on either side was maintained. More important was the implicit announcement that the old "parity" rate of 8.28 yuan per dollar was being abandoned, but there was no clear statement of how the heavily managed float would evolve. Now that the future exchange rate has become uncertain, executing monetary and foreign exchange policy in China will be much more difficult. I have five negative comments on the new policy:
(1) With the fixed exchange rate now unhinged, the People's Bank of China (PBC) will have to come up with a new anchor or rule that governs monetary policy. None was announced when the PBC let the exchange rate go. Will the PBC institute an internal inflation target? What will be the financial instruments it uses to achieve this target?
(2) Because China's inflation rate had converged to the American level (or slightly less), any substantial sustained appreciation of the RMB (the Americans want 20% to 25%) will drive China into deflation -- preceded by a slowdown in exports, domestic investment, and GDP growth more generally.
(3) If the PBC allows only small appreciations (as with the 2% appreciation announced on July 21) with the threat of more appreciations to follow, then hot money inflows will accelerate. If China attempts further financial liberalization such as interest rate decontrol, open market interest rates in China will be forced toward zero as arbitrageurs bet on a higher future value of the RMB. China is already very close to falling into a zero-interest liquidity trap much like Japan's -- the short-term interbank rate in Shanghai has fallen toward 1%. In a zero-interest liquidity trap, the PBC (like the Bank of Japan before it) would become helpless to combat deflationary pressure.
(4) Any appreciations, whether large and discrete or small and step-by-step, will have no predictable effect on China's trade surplus. The slowdown in economic growth will reduce China's demand for imports even as exports fall so that the effect on its net trade balance is indeterminate.
(5) Because the effect of appreciations on China's trade surplus will be ambiguous, American protectionists will come back again and again to complain that any appreciation is not big enough. So abandoning the "traditional" rate of 8.28 yuan per dollar will, at best, result in only a temporary relaxation of foreign pressure on China.
* * *
Lest you think that my assessment of China's new policy is too negative, compare it to the experience of Japan two decades ago and earlier. From the 1980s into the mid 1990s, Japan-bashing was in vogue in the U.S., much as China-bashing is in vogue today. Back then, Japan had the biggest bilateral trade surplus with the U.S. and was continually threatened (more by the Congress than the president) with trade sanctions unless there were temporary "voluntary" export restraints on particular exports, and the yen be allowed to appreciate. Indeed, the yen appreciated episodically all the way from 360 to the dollar in 1971 to touch 80 to the dollar in April 1995. This unhinged the Japanese financial system (the bubble economy of the late 1980s) and eventually resulted in Japan's unrelenting deflationary slump of the 1990s -- its "lost" decade. Japan has yet to recover fully and remains today in a zero-interest liquidity trap, which prevents the Bank of Japan from reigniting economic growth. And Japan's trade surplus as a share of GNP has not been reduced in any obvious way.
Thanks in large part to pressure from our lawmakers in Washington, China is now in a nebulous no man's land regarding its monetary and exchange rate policies. Instead of clear guidelines with a well-defined monetary anchor, its macro economic decision-making will be ad hoc and anybody's guess -- as was (and still is) true for Japan.

戴爾直銷電腦不敗之謎

2005年7月26日

【明報專訊】不少充滿創意的公司,最初都是在車房或大學宿舍內創辦起來。好像剛被《財富》雜誌選為全美最受讚賞公司的Dell(戴爾電腦),也是源於創辦人Michael Dell(米高戴爾)在大學宿舍內的「砌機」生意。
Dell以直銷模式聞名,並成為世界最大個人電腦生產商,兼以8.8%的邊際利潤率令同業既羨且妒。但鮮有傳媒能真正解開Dell的不敗之謎,本文嘗試剖析它在生產、物流和人力資源管理上的獨到之處。
廠房設40大門 方便櫃車上落貨
高效率的生產和物流,多少關乎廠房設計。進入Dell的廈門廠房後,即發覺廠房有兩邊各有約20扇倉門。細看之下,更發覺這些倉門和貨櫃的倉門一樣大小,可以讓整個貨櫃(車)直接泊過來,方便進貨出貨﹗
「我們叫這些貨櫃做『流動倉庫』。」戴爾(中國)有限公司中國客戶中心總經理李元鈞表示,一邊的倉門是全部用於入貨,而另一邊的則是全部用於出貨。此外,廠房內裝配員所站立的軟墊,也是由美國進口的高價貨,其作用是令裝配員雙腳沒有那麼疲勞。
李元鈞說,客戶通過互聯網或電話下單後,電腦會先將訂單集合,每隔大約1.5小時,就會向中轉倉庫(離開廠房約20分鐘車程)發出進貨指令,後者即會以貨車將那些訂單所需的零組件送來。(見圖)
當零組件運抵廠房後,員工會先按每部電腦的訂單執齊那一套零件,放在一個箱內,然後再交由其他裝配員逐件零件裝嵌、安裝軟件、進行測試等。最後,就是包裝以及按付運地區分流、集合貨品出貨。
李元鈞強調,各種零組件雖然由不同的供應商生產,但都會存放在廠房附近的中轉倉庫內(該中轉倉庫由合作的第三方物流公司擁有)。這樣,幾十個供應商就毋須各自設立倉庫。
實現零件零庫存
由於Dell和供應商有協議,當零組件存放在中轉倉庫時,仍算是供應商的﹔只有運到Dell的廠房後,才算是被Dell購入。所以理論上,Dell的廠房已經實現了零組件的零庫存﹗現時,Dell的廈門廠房每天約運作16小時。換言之,它每天都向中轉倉庫發出約10次進貨指令。
據李元鈞稱,何時向中轉倉庫補貨,是供應商的責任,但廠房和中轉倉庫的電腦系統亦已駁通,可以看到每個供應商在中轉倉庫內的存量。若真有需要,亦可提醒個別供應商向中轉倉庫補貨。
直銷模式 7日交貨 價格較低
一般來說,裝嵌過程實際只需數分鐘,連同安裝軟件和測試等,則需2至4小時。若4小時尚未完成這些工序,「Line長」則會看到一些訊號。再連同4至5小時的按付運地區分流、集合貨品等。一部電腦由顧客下單至出貨,也只需8至10小時。
李元鈞表示,按照傳統的銷售模式,一部個人電腦由生產到付運給消費者,整個過程平均約為30日。但Dell的直銷模式則將中間人省略了,實行按需生產,將整個過程縮短至平均約7日。
「對於每周降價0.5%至0.9%的零組件來說,這是很重要的。因為不用把客戶鎖在30天前的價格,客戶可以較貼近當時的硬件價格(約7日前)買到電腦,兼採用較新的配件。」他強調說。
雖然Dell的廠房已是零庫存,但在此之上,還有兩個層次的供應鏈管理。第一,是地區性的供應鏈管理團隊,他們負責估計未來3個月的零組件需求,每周都更新一次。第二,是全球性的供應鏈管理團隊,他們負責預測Dell明年的產量,以提醒供應商預先準備。
現時,Dell在全球共有6家廠房,其運作方式都非常相近,並多數貼近市場生產。例如,美國市場的訂單,就由美國境內的2家廠房生產﹔歐洲市場由愛爾蘭廠房生產﹔南美市場由巴西廠房負責﹔中國大陸、香港和日本則由廈門廠房負責。
曾經參觀Dell的美國廠房的香港電腦業人士透露,廠房的管理層向他表示,將廠房設在美國並非因為愛國,而是因為計算過物流成本後,美國的訂單還是在美國生產較划算,Dell的生產效率之高,可想而知。

專心研究加快裝嵌

對於有些人批評,Dell只懂生產,而不做研發,戴爾香港有限公司總經理張金棠有一番辯解。他表示﹕「Dell做很多研發,只不過,我們的研發是放在我們的強項──業務流程改進方面而已。」
「例如,我們在機箱上研究很多,研究怎樣的機箱設計可以令裝嵌快一些、方便一些,散熱好一些。這樣才是value to customers,而非設計處理器。」
李元鈞則進一步解釋﹕「舉例說,以我們現時的產量,絕對可以成立一個生產處理器的部門或子公司,然後自己供貨給自己。但這樣生產的處理器即使質素OK,也不會是最有競爭力的。所以,我們寧願將研究重點放在流程改進上。」
兩人的說話,令記者想起了PowerPC處理器在個人電腦市場的失敗收場。PowerPC處理器最初是由IBM、Motorola和Apple在約十年前共同研發出來,期望在個人電腦市場上大有作為。但早前Apple已宣布,兩年內全面改用Intel的處理器。
Dell很重視製造自然競爭。無論是在廠房還是在其他部門,壁報上也貼滿什麼「服務之星」、「培訓精英獎」等獎項,或得獎者的照片。據悉,得獎者可獲小禮品或現金獎勵。
員工食堂也引入競爭
至於取得突出成果的業務流程改進小組,更可以參加全球業務改進大會,受到創辦人Michael Dell親自表揚。Dell還有一隊環球業務流程改進團隊,不單改進公司內流程,甚至還培訓供應商。
即使是廈門廠房的員工食堂,也刻意引入2家中餐營辦商和1家西餐營辦商,一方面給員工多些選擇,一方面則是製造市場競爭。
Dell的員工可以自由選擇喜愛的飯菜。用餐費通過職員證上的晶片支付。如果某一營辦商的飯菜質次價高,或者菜式千篇一律,員工就會光顧其他營辦商。因此營辦商必須針對員工的喜好,提高飯菜品質。「對於飯堂營辦商,我們也讓它們處於相互競爭的氣氛之下。」李元鈞笑說。

明報記者 薛偉傑

Thursday, July 28, 2005

China's Garment Rivals Survive Storm

Smaller Asian Countries, Now Lacking Quota Help, Keep Sales in U.S. Growing


By MURRAY HIEBERT in Washington and PATRICK BARTA in Bangkok Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL July 28, 2005

When global quotas on garment exports ended on Jan. 1, China was widely expected to overrun other major Asian textile producers such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Cambodia. Half a year into the new order of unfettered competition, China's sales have indeed soared -- but other exporters are also doing surprisingly well, at least for now.
China's clothing exports to the U.S. in dollar terms jumped 85.9% in the first five months of 2005 from the year-earlier period. But other key Asian garment-makers are also enjoying unexpected double-digit growth. Bangladesh's exports to the U.S. were up 25%, Sri Lanka's rose 20%, while Cambodia's sales increased 16.8%.
Until this year, these and other exporters were covered by the so-called Multifiber Agreement, an international pact dating back to the early 1970s. Under the pact, poor countries got reliable access to U.S. and European markets through quotas that limited competing garment exports from more-efficient producers, notably China.
[Take an interactive look at how the expiry of textile quotas has affected the global clothing industry. ]
Other Asian exporters have survived, in part, because Western importers still want to diversify their sources of supply, despite the attraction of China or India, another beneficiary of the end of the old quota system.
"None of the sourcing specialists would put too high [a percentage of their] business into China," says Peter McGrath, a J.C. Penney Co. executive vice president responsible for the company's overseas purchases. "We knew that would be a risky deal."
Moves by the U.S. and Europe to impose "safeguards" to limit the pace of Chinese garment export growth are one of the risks that giant U.S. retailers such as J.C. Penney, Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and Target Corp. have sought to avoid. That has prompted them to retain alternative suppliers in other countries.
As part of its 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization, China agreed that fellow WTO members could impose limits on Chinese textile imports if they were found to cause market disruption. In some product categories, such as cotton knit shirts and pants, China by June had already filled the new U.S. limits determined by the safeguards.
In addition, threats that the U.S. Congress might impose a variety of trade sanctions and increase tariffs on Chinese products have "caused some folks to diminish some of their sourcing from China that they might have been planning," says Steven Lamar of the American Apparel and Footwear Association.
Some Asian manufacturers are also benefiting by identifying niche products that China hasn't yet mastered. In the case of Sri Lanka, manufacturers such as Colombo-based MAS Holdings Ltd. are focusing on higher-end, "value-added" garments such as women's intimate apparel that require extra skill to make. "We've been able to hold on to our share of the business," says MAS Chairman Mahesh Amalean, whose customers include Victoria's Secret and Banana Republic.
Cambodia, meanwhile, has bolstered its slice of the market by adopting an unusual labor program monitored by foreign inspectors which ensures that its workers aren't exploited. Phnom Penh negotiated this labor agreement with the U.S. in 1999 to make its factories more attractive to American and European buyers whose company guidelines prohibit sourcing garments made under sweatshop conditions.
Those kinds of efforts appear to be paying off. "Improved labor standards certainly work in favor of countries like Cambodia," says Dan Henkle, vice president of social responsibility for Gap Inc.
Although predictions of mass layoffs and shuttered factories haven't come true, South and Southeast Asian countries still face formidable challenges in preserving their garment industries, which are crucial sources of employment and hard currency and have helped them get a foothold in the global economy. In Bangladesh, for example, garments represent 81.3% of the country's exports to the U.S. in dollar terms; for Cambodia the figure is 94.7%, and for Sri Lanka, 79.4%.
Many Asian garment-makers do feel the squeeze from China's low-cost factories. For instance, prices for lower-end products in Cambodia, such as T-shirts and blue jeans, have plummeted 30% since the beginning of the year, says Cham Prasidh, Cambodia's trade minister.
He says Cambodian factories will have to reduce costs and shorten delivery times if they hope to compete with China in the long run. To do so, he says, Phnom Penh is investing $10 million to streamline its customs procedures to speed delivery of its products and cut down on corruption, which adds to the cost of exports.
Mr. Prasidh visited Washington last week to press Congress to slash tariffs to zero on clothing exports to the U.S. from 14 poor countries, mostly from Asia and including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Nepal and tsunami-affected Sri Lanka. Because of higher labor costs created by Cambodia's labor agreement with the U.S., the minister contends, the country's garment industry can only compete if it has duty-free access to the American market. U.S. duties on Chinese-made clothing average about 15%.
Bangladesh has also survived the apocalyptic predictions for its textile trade. But Bangladeshi officials point out that their export surge in recent months comes off a relatively low base last year because the country's garment exports had fallen since 2000 as the quota system was phased out.
Fakrul Ashan, the commercial attache in the Bangladesh Embassy in Washington, says it isn't guaranteed that the early export pace will continue through the year because the country's factories have "abnormally low orders from July onwards." He acknowledges, however, that orders could pick up as the limits on China's exports to the U.S. kick in.
At least one major Bangladeshi garment producer, Mohammadi Group, has actually expanded this year as orders have increased from American companies, including Wal-Mart, says group head Annisul Huq. Some industry analysts believe the country's more-efficient producers could even thrive in the new trade environment by acquiring factories from less-productive manufacturers. If that consolidation occurs, says Mr. Huq, who is president of the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association, the country's textile industry could become more competitive.
Eventually, some of China's exporting rivals in Asia could also benefit from growing domestic demand in China itself. Mr. McGrath of J.C. Penney believes Chinese consumption of domestically produced garments will rise in the next three to five years, prompting "the desire to export to diminish." This, he predicts, will drive orders from U.S. buyers to other Asian countries.

WSJ : Huawei Stumbles on Road to the U.S.


Huawei Discovers Low PricesAren't Enough to Take On Giants Cisco and Lucent

In America, Call It Futurewei

By CHRISTOPHER RHOADS and REBECCA BUCKMAN Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL July 28, 2005; Page A1

In March 2001, a handful of executives from Huawei Technologies Co. took a floor in a five-story glass office building off a highway in a suburb of Dallas. Their mission: Use the company's cut-rate prices to take customers from the likes of Cisco Systems Inc. and Lucent Technologies Inc.
Today, that goal remains elusive. China's largest telecom-equipment maker has yet to land any deals with big U.S. phone companies, such as SBC Communications Inc. or BellSouth Corp., winning only some contracts with smaller firms.
"It has taken longer than we thought," says Bai Yi, Huawei's business-development director for North America and one of the first Huawei executives in the U.S. "We still have a long way to go to learn about this market."
Driven by a tighter market at home and a desire to build its own multinationals, the Chinese government has begun encouraging its leading companies to grow abroad. Chinese oil company Cnooc Ltd.'s recent $18.5 billion bid to acquire Unocal Corp. is just the boldest example of corporate China's global aspiration. Yet a look at Huawei's U.S. experience to date shows just how far China still has to go to translate its growing economic might into sophisticated global competitors.
With little experience in marketing, Huawei has struggled to build brand recognition in the U.S. It confused customers by using a new name for its U.S. business. With the headquarters in Shenzhen, China, hesitant to delegate, local executives have trouble adapting to the local culture. The company has been dogged by suspicions of cutting corners on intellectual-property rights, and alienated some job applicants by pumping them for detailed technical information. Huawei's successful formula winning business in other countries with low prices hasn't worked as well in a U.S. market marked by long-term ties between phone companies and their equipment suppliers.
The company's setbacks in the U.S. contrast with its recent progress elsewhere outside China. From the Middle East to Latin America and, more recently, Europe, Huawei has taken business from global giants such as Germany's Siemens AG and France's Alcatel SA. Of the 19 licenses issued around the world last year for high-end wireless networks known as "third generation," Huawei was involved in building 14 of them, according to BDA China Ltd., a Beijing-based research firm. BT Group PLC, the large British telecom company, recently gave Huawei an important stamp of approval, awarding the Chinese vendor part of a $19 billion project.
Huawei has come a long way from its beginnings in 1988, when founder Ren Zhengfei, a former officer in China's People's Liberation Army, used a contact in the Chinese government to obtain some rudimentary telecom gear. Mr. Ren's background helped the company win military contracts during the early, lean years, according to former Huawei executives.
Today, the PLA accounts for less than 1% of Huawei's business, the company says. With $3.8 billion of revenue in 2004, Huawei still ranks far behind leaders like Alcatel, which had $15 billion of revenue last year. But Huawei is growing by nearly 50% a year, while established vendors are only just beginning to grow again after the telecom bust wiped out much of their business several years ago.
With eight regional headquarters and 55 offices around the world, the company expects that this year revenue from outside China will at least equal that from China for the first time. Of its global work force of 24,000, many are housed at Huawei's sprawling, modern headquarters in Shenzhen, in brightly painted dorms, surrounded by neatly manicured lawns, basketball courts and swimming pools. The streets are named after famous scientists, such as Marie Curie and Deng Jiaxian, a key developer of China's first atomic bomb.
Like the global push of Cnooc and other large Chinese companies, Huawei's expansion is fueled in part by cheap loans from the Chinese government. Last year, the company, which is owned by its employees, received a $10 billion line of credit from the China Development Bank, and an additional $600 million from the official Export-Import Bank of China for its international expansion.
But Huawei's push into the U.S. differs from its compatriots in one key way: While other expansion-minded Chinese firms are trying to buy their way into the American market, Huawei is trying to grow by lining up its own new customers.
When they opened their doors in 2001 in Plano, Texas, Huawei executives sought to blend into their surroundings as quickly as possible. They share their building with law offices, realtors and a regional office of lingerie company Victoria's Secret. A Texas state flag and an American receptionist greet visitors in Huawei's ground-floor lobby. The company now has about 150 employees in the Plano office and in a few sales offices around the U.S.
Shortly after the U.S. launch, Huawei executives realized that Americans had trouble pronouncing the company's name (HWA-way). Mr. Bai, 32 years old, says he noticed that the company's new landlord in Plano kept calling it "hoo-way." Potential customers, and even some of Huawei's own American employees, called it "high-way" and "how-way," among other variations.
The company decided to come up with another name for the U.S. subsidiary. It decided on Futurewei as a working name, and then contacted Darren Avrea, the co-founder of Dallas advertising firm AvreaFoster, to test it and provide alternatives. Mr. Avrea says his firm offered 30 possible names for Huawei's U.S. business. The project became frustrating, Mr. Avrea says, because all decision-making was handled by company headquarters in China. And then, after several months, the company opted for its initial idea, Futurewei.
"From a global marketing point of view, we never understood why not stay with the Huawei name in the U.S. and ride the coattails of the mother ship," says Mr. Avrea.
While Americans could more easily pronounce the new name, the company now had two names. "We have to explain to customers, what is Huawei and what is Futurewei, and what the relationship is, and that can take two minutes," says Mr. Bai. The company has done little to promote the new name. What few ads have appeared in U.S. magazines have used the Huawei name, rather than the Futurewei name, according to Douglas Black, the Huawei spokesman for North America. The Futurewei name appears on its booths at trade shows, brochures and other materials.
For their part, Huawei employees struggled with understanding the Texas accent and some expressions. "There are a lot of words in Texas that are completely different from the English that we learned in China," acknowledges Lin Haibo, an executive in charge of Huawei's research and engineering in North America. Mr. Bai says some Huawei executives were perplexed in the early days when Americans said, "have a wonderful day."
Huawei sought to make its public face as American as possible. The company began recruiting from the deep pool of local telecom talent in the Plano area, home to offices of many large telecom companies, such as Nortel Networks Corp. and Cisco. But the relationship between U.S. employees and Huawei executives was sometimes strained.
Chad Reynolds, Huawei's former head of human resources for North America, says when he visited the headquarters in China he was forbidden from carrying his briefcase into any of the main meeting rooms. He says his employers worried about theft of product documents. He was never given a security pass and was accompanied by security personnel wherever he went. "I never felt like I was truly part of the family at Huawei," says Mr. Reynolds, who says he quit in spring 2003. Huawei declined to comment about Mr. Reynolds.
Huawei admits it wasn't prepared for the time and effort needed to break into the U.S. market, where lower prices are sometimes not enough to land a deal.
In the developing world, where Huawei has enjoyed the bulk of its success outside of China, the company has won business with prices 25% or more below those of Western bidders. In mature markets, like Europe and the U.S. where vendors and clients have longstanding ties, leading-edge technology is just as important as a good price.
One potential customer, Telepak Networks Inc., a telecom-services provider in Jackson, Miss., said it would consider Huawei equipment after putting it through exhaustive, months-long trials -- a common procedure when considering new equipment from an unknown company. Scott Rice, who was in charge of Huawei's carrier sales at the time and led the effort to win the Telepak business, says his superiors at Huawei were surprised by this. "I think they expected things to be more like the Chinese market, where you get products in the network quickly without going through the paces," says the 54-year-old Mr. Rice. Telepak ultimately took its business elsewhere.
"The product just wasn't the best at the time in the industry," says Tillman Rodabough, the director of commercial networks at Telepak.
Huawei also raised eyebrows because of the lengths it would go to obtain industry know-how. Recruiters would ask job applicants to prepare highly detailed reports on specific product areas in which the company intended to compete in the U.S., Mr. Reynolds and several other former employees say.
Two years ago, David Fox, a software engineer who had worked at several area telecom firms, was invited for an interview in Huawei's Shenzhen headquarters. On the first day of his visit, Mr. Fox, then 39, says he was startled when a group of 25 to 30 Chinese engineers began peppering him with detailed questions on engineering minutiae, scribbling notes as he spoke. "It became evident that this wasn't an interview," says Mr. Fox. "They were pumping me for technical knowledge of the U.S."
Mr. Fox became more alarmed when the company then asked him to agree in writing that any invention that came from his visit would belong to the company, he says. He refused to sign, he says, informing his hosts of his wish to end his visit and return to the U.S. Several days after returning home, Mr. Fox was informed the company wasn't interested in hiring him, he says. Mr. Fox later got a job with Tellabs Inc., another telecom-equipment vendor.
Mr. Black, the Huawei spokesman, says he can't comment on Mr. Fox's interview because he is unfamiliar with the company's hiring practices before 2003, when the current head of human resources took the job. "Our practices today are standard interview techniques," says Mr. Black. "We don't ask anyone for proprietary information."
In January 2003, Cisco sued Huawei in a U.S. district court in Marshall, Texas, alleging the Chinese company copied its router code, including bugs in Cisco's code, according to the complaint. Huawei even used the same model numbers, to make it easier for customers to switch to the cheaper Huawei versions, according to the suit.
Sales contracts in the works were killed at the news, including a "significant" deal with WorldCom Inc., according to Mr. Rice, the former salesperson. Huawei had planned to trumpet the important business in a press release as a sign of its U.S. progress, he says.
Cisco later agreed to drop the lawsuit after Huawei removed the router products from the market and then altered them. Huawei didn't admit guilt in the settlement. The suit "affected us adversely," acknowledges Mr. Bai. Due to the subsequent decline in sales, the company laid off about a half-dozen salespeople, he says.
Just as the bad publicity from the Cisco suit was fading, Huawei stumbled again. In June 2004, at a trade show in Chicago, a Huawei employee was caught taking pictures after hours of the insides of some high-end equipment from Fujitsu Ltd. Authorities found a list in the employee's clothing of names of other telecom companies. Huawei later fired the employee, explaining the company hadn't used his photos and that it was his first time in the U.S.
Huawei can look to Japan for an encouraging case history. When Japan's Toyota Motor Corp. first entered the U.S. in the 1970s, it had a poor dealer network and cars seen as cheap, small and unreliable. Ultimately, Chinese firms like Huawei "will learn and invest, just as Japan and South Korea did before them," says Albert Lin, an analyst in the San Francisco office of American Technology Research.
In February 2004, Huawei landed its first contract with a U.S. wireless carrier. In recent months, it has announced several other deals with small wireless U.S. carriers, such as NTCH Inc. of Hermosa Beach, Calif. Huawei declined to specify the number or amounts of the deals.
"We need to present Huawei better," says Mr. Lin, Huawei's head of R&D for North America. "We also have to make it clear that we are not just testing the waters in the U.S."

Wednesday, July 27, 2005

Crude Guess: Most Analysts SeeYuan Move Lifting Oil Demand

By PATRICK BARTA Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL July 27, 2005

Investors wondering how last week's yuan revaluation will affect Chinese demand for oil and other key commodities can be forgiven for scratching their heads in confusion.
Commodity analysts issued a frenzy of research reports, many of them contradictory, after China moved to raise the value of its currency against the U.S. dollar by 2.1%. UBS analysts suggest that global oil prices might now rise with "possibly higher" Chinese buying. Merrill Lynch, meanwhile, offered what amounted to a three-pronged forecast: more demand for crude in the near term, "possibly" weaker demand in six to twelve months, and overall stronger demand in the long run.
Some analysts even contended investors shouldn't worry much about the revaluation at all, given its small size -- and the confusion it caused. "I'm certainly not going to get excited about it," said Jim Lennon, a commodities analyst at Macquarie Bank in London.
The truth is, it's still too early to know for sure how the revaluation will affect oil and other commodities, partly because it isn't clear if China will follow up with additional yuan increases and, if so, when.
REVALUING THE YUAN
See complete coverage.
But a few things are clear. First, a stronger Chinese currency gives Chinese importers more purchasing power to buy oil and other commodities. If the yuan's value rises further, so too would China's buying power. All things being equal, that should allow China to scoop up even more oil, iron ore, coal, nickel and other basic materials than it does today.
Second, the impact of China's beefed-up buying power, while important, is likely to be overshadowed in the long run by the overall performance of China's economy, which itself will be affected by currency revaluations. If currency revaluations result in a meaningful slowdown in Chinese exports by making them more expensive to the outside world, and overall growth ebbs, China's demand for oil and metals would inevitably drop.
But if the currency revaluations result in a more balanced Chinese economy by giving domestic consumers more power to buy autos, air-conditioning units and other commodity-intensive products, China's appetite for raw materials could wind up being sustained for many years to come. Right now, the consensus seems to be that the latter outcome is more likely, because few economic analysts believe the Chinese economy will slow substantially any time soon.
So ABN Amro Holding has advised clients to boost holdings of resource-company stocks, notably Australian mining concerns, as the Chinese currency appreciates. Like many banks, ABN Amro likes the two big regional players with the broadest exposure to minerals: Anglo-Australian mining giants BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto.
Similarly, UBS predicts that in the Asian-Pacific region, basic-materials stocks in general are likely to see "positive moves" as a result of the upward valuation of the yuan, although the bank remains less bullish about steel as China boosts its domestic production.
The picture for oil, however, is a lot more complicated. The latest data suggest that China's oil-import growth has already slowed, and the International Energy Agency in Paris recently downgraded its forecast for Chinese oil demand this year.
But it's unclear if those trends reflect a fundamental decline in underlying oil demand, or a temporary pause caused by imbalances in the Chinese marketplace. Many analysts prefer the second explanation, partly because they believe oil demand was restrained earlier this year as Chinese companies worked off stockpiles accumulated in 2004.
Also, many analysts believe Chinese refineries cut back on imports recently not because of weakening demand, but because of eroding profit margins. Because the Chinese government regulates domestic prices for refined petroleum products, keeping them artificially low, refineries can't jack up prices whenever their input costs rise. That may have encouraged some refineries to throttle down production this year rather than pump out refined products at a loss, or to shift some of their production to be sold outside of China.
In a move last week that drew less attention than the currency revaluation, Chinese authorities raised retail diesel prices by 6% and gasoline prices by 6.4%.
"This makes a big difference to the profitability of local refineries," which in turn should boost their ability to buy more oil, analysts at Barclays Capital said in a report late last week. Barclays recently predicted a ninth consecutive quarterly increase in the average global price of crude oil in the third quarter, with prices for West Texas Intermediate crude expected to average $60.10 a barrel. That would mark an increase of just under $8 a barrel from the previous quarter and would be the largest quarterly increase in the past two years.
Similarly, National Australia Bank warned in a recent research report that "reports of [oil demand's] death are greatly exaggerated." NAB noted that China's refiners plan to add about 330,000 barrels a day of new capacity during the next two years, with much of that capacity designed to handle lower-cost heavy and sour crude.
As that capacity comes online, the bank contends, it should give Chinese refineries more room to maintain profit margins even if consumer prices stay capped, which in turn should encourage them to keep buying oil.
As a result, "we may see a return to the demand growth I expected to see in China," which is greater than the recent trend, says NAB analyst Gerard Burg.
In the long run, China's oil consumption will still be driven by how well the economy holds up with a stronger currency, and by the overall cost of oil to the consumer, rather than by short-term issues related to refining capacity.
At least one analyst, David Thurtell of Commonwealth Bank of Australia in Sydney, still believes demand will ultimately cool. As some analysts note, continued increases in the yuan's value could give the Chinese government more room to raise consumer fuel prices without triggering inflation -- the one step that many analysts believe is needed before China can seriously curb its thirst for oil.
By Mr. Thurtell's reckoning, once all of China's moves last week are factored in, oil products are actually more expensive for the average Chinese consumer today than they were before the revaluation.
"At the end of the day, the outlook is for China to remain strong and commodity demand to keep going," Mr. Thurtell says. But "it's hard to see Chinese fuel consumption rising [a lot more] when they've just raised prices 6%."

Tuesday, July 26, 2005

Gallup : Consumers Anticipate Less Debt

But so far few Americans have been successful at reducing balances

July 19, 2005

by Raksha Arora, Business and Economy Editor

The most recent Experian/Gallup Personal Credit survey indicates that while about half of U.S. consumers expect their debt levels to drop over the next six months, relatively few Americans are reducing their debt burdens.

Americans' Views of Economy Unchanged After London Bombings

No signs of significant change in recent months
July 13, 2005 by Frank Newport Gallup

Americans' views of the economy remain fairly steady -- and weak. On balance, more Americans perceive the economy as getting worse than getting better, and only a little more than a third are willing to rate the current economy as excellent or good. Just about 4 out of 10 workers say it's a good time to find a quality job. These readings of consumer confidence have not changed materially over the last month or two and did not change significantly as a result of the London bombings of last Thursday. The broad picture shows that the American public's feelings about the economy are more positive now than they were in 2003, but economic optimism for the first half of this year has been well below its average level last year.

High Energy Prices, Job Outsourcing -- Not Terrorism -- Worry Many Investors

Substantial investors are much more optimistic than average investors about the economic outlook

by Dennis Jacobe GALLUP NEWS SERVICE July 25, 2005

PRINCETON, NJ -- Overall investor optimism increased slightly once again in July -- the second marginal increase in a row, according to the latest UBS/Gallup Index of Investor Optimism poll. Among the top investor worries holding back investor optimism are concerns about today's high energy prices and the continued outsourcing of jobs overseas. Even though the initial wave of terrorist bombings in London took place during the poll, the threat of another terror attack in the United States remains low on the list of investor concerns.
Since the July 7 bombings, the Dow has surged 381 points and has approached a four-year high. While this seems to validate the relatively low ranking of "a potential new terrorist attack" in the poll, it also seems to contradict the tepid improvement in optimism recorded during the past two months.
The answer to this contradiction appears to lie in the significant divergence in views between substantial investors (those having $100,000 or more in investable assets) and average investors (those having at least $10,000 but less than $100,000 in investable assets). Substantial investors are not only more optimistic than other investors about their own personal portfolios but also more optimistic about the future direction of the economy. And, it is the views of substantial investors that seem to be driving Wall Street at the moment.
Energy Prices Remain the Top Investor Worry
Given oil prices at nearly $60 a barrel and the recent increases in gas prices at the pump, it is not surprising that energy prices top the list of investor worries in July, with 71% saying the price of gas and oil is hurting the current investment climate "a lot." This is similar to the 72% who held such concerns in May, but up from 56% in February.
Second among investor worries -- behind energy prices -- is the outsourcing of jobs to foreign countries, with 61% of investors saying this activity is hurting the current investment climate a lot. Concerns over the federal budget deficit are next, with 51% of investors saying it is hurting the investment climate a lot, followed by the current situation in Iraq at 46%, identity theft at 44%, questionable accounting practices at 42%, and illegal immigration at 39%.
Eighth on the list among the 12 potential sources of concern included in the poll is the threat of more terrorist attacks, with 36% of investors saying this is hurting the investment climate a lot. This is up from the 28% of investors who had similar concerns in February and May.
Significantly, few investors seem worried about higher interest rates, even after the Fed has hiked short-term interest rates nine consecutive times at its regular monetary policy meetings. Only 17% of investors say the current level of interest rates is hurting the investment climate a lot. This is virtually the same as the 16% who were concerned in May and the 15% who were similarly worried in February.
Investor Optimism Remains Weak
Overall investor optimism has increased slightly over the past couple of months, going from 50 in May to 54 in June, and then to its current reading of 58. However, the Index of Investor Optimism remains within eight points of the May reading, its lowest level of the past two years.
The Personal Dimension is at 56 -- up from 53 in June and 51 in May. The Economic Dimension is at 2, suggesting that investors as a whole are essentially neutral on the future direction of the U.S. economy.
Substantial Investor Optimism Surges
Substantial investor optimism nearly doubled in June, increasing to 91 from 51 in May. It increased another four points to 95 this month. In sharp contrast, average investor optimism fell 15 points, decreasing from 49 in May to 34 in June. In July, it increased by three points and now stands at 37. While substantial investors are somewhat optimistic about the economy, as reflected by their Economic Dimension rating of 17, average investors are somewhat pessimistic, with a rating of –7.
Why the Divergence in Views?
On July 20 and 21, in what may be Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan's last presentation to the House and the Senate concerning the future course of the economy and monetary policy, he observed, "The data released over the past two months or so accord with the view that the earlier soft readings on the economy were not presaging a more serious slowdown in the pace of [economic] activity. Employment has remained on an upward trend, retail spending has posted appreciable gains, inventory levels are modest, and business investment appears to have firmed."
He went on to say, "Should the prices of crude oil and natural gas flatten out after their recent run-up -- the forecast currently embedded in the futures markets -- the prospects for aggregate demand appear favorable."
These statements seem to fully reflect the views held by most substantial investors and much of Wall Street. The idea as enunciated by Greenspan is that today's consumers will continue to buy despite the current high gas prices because of their wealth gains in both the stock and real estate markets, relatively low interest rates, and ongoing increases in employment and income.
All of this is true for those who have quality jobs, own their homes, and have stock or other substantial investments in the equity markets and/or the real estate markets. In this context, high gas prices are an unpleasant burden but one that is manageable. Since most substantial investors fall into this category, it is not surprising that they, like Wall Street, are optimistic about both the economy and the investment climate.
On the other hand, there are many lower- and middle-income Americans who have not enjoyed these significant wealth gains. Many have also experienced wage compression and have seen employees where they work and at other companies laid off because of corporate outsourcing to foreign countries or for other reasons. The fact that many of these layoffs are occurring at companies reporting significant profits only adds to the level of employee job insecurity.
According to the Department of Energy, the average price of a gallon of regular gas last week in the United States was $2.32 -- up $0.39 from a year ago. For many lower- and middle-income consumers, this surge in gas prices at the pump is causing real financial hardship. Since many average investors fall into this category, it is also not surprising that they tend to be much less optimistic about both the economy and the investment climate.
Does This Divergence Matter?
Clearly, where one sits in today's economy in terms of wealth, income, and job security matters a great deal to one's individual well-being. But, does it matter from an overall economic perspective? Evidently, many substantial investors, Wall Street observers, and monetary policymakers don't seem to think this divergence will slow the economy in the months ahead. It may not be until retailers report their results for the important back-to-school sales period that it will be clear whether the optimists are right.
Survey Methods
Results for the Index of Investor Optimism poll are based on telephone interviews with 801 investors with at least $10,000 of investable assets, aged 18 and older, conducted July 1-17, 2005. For results based on the total sample of investors, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is ±4 percentage points. In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

Toyota, Moving Northward

By PAUL KRUGMAN

July 25, 2005

Modern American politics is dominated by the doctrine that government is the problem, not the solution. In practice, this doctrine translates into policies that make low taxes on the rich the highest priority, even if lack of revenue undermines basic public services. You don't have to be a liberal to realize that this is wrong-headed. Corporate leaders understand quite well that good public services are also good for business. But the political environment is so polarized these days that top executives are often afraid to speak up against conservative dogma.
Instead, they vote with their feet. Which brings us to the story of Toyota's choice.
There has been fierce competition among states hoping to attract a new Toyota assembly plant. Several Southern states reportedly offered financial incentives worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
But last month Toyota decided to put the new plant, which will produce RAV4 mini-S.U.V.'s, in Ontario. Explaining why it passed up financial incentives to choose a U.S. location, the company cited the quality of Ontario's work force.
What made Toyota so sensitive to labor quality issues? Maybe we should discount remarks from the president of the Toronto-based Automotive Parts Manufacturers' Association, who claimed that the educational level in the Southern United States was so low that trainers for Japanese plants in Alabama had to use "pictorials" to teach some illiterate workers how to use high-tech equipment.
But there are other reports, some coming from state officials, that confirm his basic point: Japanese auto companies opening plants in the Southern U.S. have been unfavorably surprised by the work force's poor level of training.
There's some bitter irony here for Alabama's governor. Just two years ago voters overwhelmingly rejected his plea for an increase in the state's rock-bottom taxes on the affluent, so that he could afford to improve the state's low-quality education system. Opponents of the tax hike convinced voters that it would cost the state jobs.
But education is only one reason Toyota chose Ontario. Canada's other big selling point is its national health insurance system, which saves auto manufacturers large sums in benefit payments compared with their costs in the United States.
You might be tempted to say that Canadian taxpayers are, in effect, subsidizing Toyota's move by paying for health coverage. But that's not right, even aside from the fact that Canada's health care system has far lower costs per person than the American system, with its huge administrative expenses. In fact, U.S. taxpayers, not Canadians, will be hurt by the northward movement of auto jobs.
To see why, bear in mind that in the long run decisions like Toyota's probably won't affect the overall number of jobs in either the United States or Canada. But the result of international competition will be to give Canada more jobs in industries like autos, which pay health benefits to their U.S. workers, and fewer jobs in industries that don't provide those benefits. In the U.S. the effect will be just the reverse: fewer jobs with benefits, more jobs without.
So what's the impact on taxpayers? In Canada, there's no impact at all: since all Canadians get government-provided health insurance in any case, the additional auto jobs won't increase government spending.
But U.S. taxpayers will suffer, because the general public ends up picking up much of the cost of health care for workers who don't get insurance through their jobs. Some uninsured workers and their families end up on Medicaid. Others end up depending on emergency rooms, which are heavily subsidized by taxpayers.
Funny, isn't it? Pundits tell us that the welfare state is doomed by globalization, that programs like national health insurance have become unsustainable. But Canada's universal health insurance system is handling international competition just fine. It's our own system, which penalizes companies that treat their workers well, that's in trouble.
I'm sure that some readers will respond to everything I've just said by asking why, if the Canadians are so smart, they aren't richer. But I'll have to leave the issue of America's comparative economic performance for another day.
For now, let me just point out that treating people decently is sometimes a competitive advantage. In America, basic health insurance is a privilege; in Canada, it's a right. And in the auto industry, at least, the good jobs are heading north.
E-mail: krugman@nytimes.com

Sales of Existing Homes Set Record Pace in June

July 25, 2005
By VIKAS BAJAJ New York Times

Data : Existing Home Sales http://www.realtor.org/Research.nsf/Pages/EHSdata

The nation's roaring housing market set its second record in three months as sales of existing homes climbed 2.7 percent in June, to 7.33 million, according to a report released today.
Low mortgage rates and strong demand drove the frenetic sales activity, which far exceeded analysts' expectations. Median prices rose 14.7 percent from a year ago, to $219,000. Average sales prices climbed 9.4 percent, to $268,000.
The National Association of Realtors' report provides yet another sign that the housing market remains vibrant and continues to be a big player in the nation's economic expansion. The health and sustainability of home sales has been a subject of much discussion by economists and policy makers.
The regions showing the greatest gains in prices were the West and the Northeast, where median prices rose 17.4 percent and 13.6 percent, respectively. The other two regions - the Midwest and the South - showed smaller, but healthy gains of 12.7 percent and 9 percent, respectively.
Existing home sales for June broke a record set in April, when 7.18 million homes traded hands. Sales fell slightly in May to 7.14 million. Analysts had been expecting 7.15 million sales in June.
"But sales cannot continue to rise at this pace," Ian Shepherdson, chief United States economist for High Frequency Economics, wrote in a note to clients. "They probably cannot even remain at their current level for long."
Historically low mortgage rates have been attributed for a steep rise in sales and housing prices over the last few years, prompting some economists to suggest the nation is experiencing a housing bubble that will eventually burst and deal the economy a significant setback.
Nationally, median prices are 40.2 percent higher today than they were in 2002. In the West and the Northeast, the regions with the greatest growth, they are up 49.9 percent and 56 percent, respectively.
Even the National Association of Realtors, which represents real estate agents, suggested the price growth cannot continue in perpetuity.
"Eventually, appreciation rates will slow and come down to normal levels when the shortage of homes on the market improves and comes closer into balance, hopefully, by the second half of next year," Al Mansell, the association's president, said in a statement.
Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve chairman, told Congress last week that housing prices in some areas may well fall, but he noted that such corrections would not necessarily harm the economy.

Friday, July 22, 2005

6月新增貸款4653億元,分別是5月新增量的4.3倍和4月的3.27倍


4653億元!這樣一個數位作為央行日前公佈的6月單月信貸增長,確實令人稱奇。根據央行日前公佈的數據,6月當月新增人民幣貸款為4653億元,而5月和4月的新增人民幣貸款分別為1078億元和1420億元,6月貸款增量是5月的4.3倍和4月的3.27倍。6月貸款增長同比多增1832億元,而4、5兩月都是同比少增。
國泰君安研究所宏觀經濟研究員孫建平對《第一財經日報》記者表示:“6月份信貸投放逼近歷史紀錄水準。”歷史數據顯示,6月當月4653億元的貸款增量,僅比兩年前貸款高峰期2003年6月少增486億元,在貸款高峰的2003年,6月以外的其他月份貸款增長都未破4000億元關口。
6月單月增長佔到前半年的比例達32.1%,前5個月信貸增長總共不足萬億元。
為什麼6月份貸款增長如此迅速?
記者採訪到的一位銀行人士表示:“央行最近的窗口指導是要求我們在規避貸款風險和行業風險的基礎上,能進行積極營銷,引導銀行根據情況能多發放一些貸款。”4、5月份宏觀經濟運行數據公佈後,經濟增長放緩在一定程度上達成了共識,央行也敏銳地觀察到了這些,5、6月份外匯佔款公開市場上已經是不完全對衝,此外在我國現在的融資體系下,貸款增長放緩對經濟產生的影響很大。
這位銀行人士還表示,央行指導中傳達的意思還表現在貸款期限搭配上,即多發放流動資金貸款,控制中長期貸款。央行數位顯示,上半年非金融性公司及其他部門貸款增加1.18萬億元,同比多增1719億元,其中,短期貸款及票據融資增加6528億元,同比多增1660億元;中長期貸款增加5183億元,同比多增僅249億元。
孫建平還對記者解釋了可能成為6月份貸款的反常性突破性增長的其他原因。
一是到年中的時候各銀行要做半年經營數據統計,出於利潤考核機制和不良貸款率下降的原因,會多放一些貸款,這一點在前些年的6月份都可以看出。
二是自去年11月到今年5月份以來,銀行在資產配置上,有價證券投資一直在增多、貸款投放相比謹慎很多,但隨著債券市場收益率的下滑,有些甚至已經低於銀行的平均資金成本,出於銀行資產配置的原因多放貸款。
三是央行極力推行的企業短期融資券一定程度上在打壓商業銀行的流動資金貸款,銀行出於搶佔市場份額等因素,在流動資金貸款的發放上提高了主動性,這也是積極應對下半年短期融資券發行高峰的前期應對性調整。
至於6月份信貸反彈性增長會不會只是下半年銀行積極放貸的預演,孫建平表示暫時還說不清楚,“雖然6月份的信貸增長絕不只是季節因素造成的,但下半年的信貸增長形式仍不好判斷,銀行資本充足率問題、貸款風險問題都難以規避。”
不過,孫建平表示:“全年完成信貸目標應該是沒有問題的。”央行公佈的數據還顯示,上半年人民幣貸款增加1.45萬億元,同比多增240億元。1.45萬億元的貸款增長已經佔到了央行全年2.5萬億增長目標的58%。
他分析表示,上半年1.45萬億元完成率不足60%,低於往年比例,下半年月均完成1750億元,全年即達標運行,信貸目標可以實現。(記者 徐以升 發自北京)

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銀監會擬窗口指導銀行關注小企業貸款
銀監會主席劉明康要求,銀行業金融機構要把繼續推進小企業貸款制度創新,改進對中小企業的融資服務,作為促進加快經濟結構調整與增長方式轉變的一項重要措施。

主要金融機構不良貸款繼續實現“雙降”
上半年銀行業監管工作取得新進展,主要銀行業金融機構6月末不良貸款餘額15927億元,比年初減少5542.6億元(含工商銀行政策性剝離因素);不良貸款比率為10.15%,比年初下降3.95個百分點。不良貸款餘額和比例繼續實現雙下降。

WSJ : Whither the Yuan?

David Altig is vice president and associate director of research in the research department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. His research focuses on monetary and fiscal policy issues. Before joining the bank in January 1991, Altig was an assistant professor of business economics and public policy at Indiana University. He is currently an adjunct professor of economics in the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago. He received a bachelor's degree in business administration from the University of Iowa and master's and doctoral degrees in economics from Brown University. His blog is Macroblog. His comments in this Econoblog represent his own opinion, not those of the Federal Reserve.

Nouriel Roubini is associate professor of economics at New York University's Stern School of Business and a senior academic researcher in the field of international macroeconomics. He was senior economist for international affairs at the White House Council of Economic Advisers from 1998 to 1999; then worked as an adviser and director of the Office of Policy Development and Review at the Treasury Department from 1999 to 2000. His latest book, "Bailouts or Bail-ins? Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Markets," was published in 2004. He maintains the Global Macroeconomics Web site and blogs regularly at his Global Economics blog. A graduate of Bocconi University in Milan, he received his doctorate in economics from Harvard University.

July 21, 2005 6:38 p.m.

China's decision to lift the yuan's peg to the dollar marks a modest but important first step in overhauling its strict currency regime. The yuan has been strengthened1, effective immediately, to a rate of 8.11 yuan to the U.S. dollar -- compared with the 8.28 yuan it has been set at for more than a decade -- and the currency will now be allowed to trade in a tight 0.3% band against a basket of foreign currencies.
While praising the step, many economists, analysts and U.S. politicians had been hoping China's first move would have been to strengthen the yuan more sharply, making Chinese exports more expensive in the U.S. -- and perhaps helping to close the countries' wide trade gap.
WSJ.com asked economist bloggers Nouriel Roubini and David Altig to take a closer look at the news and the numbers. What do you think? Share your comments on our discussion board.2
* * *
10:45 a.m. EDT
Nouriel Roubini writes: Last week I predicted on my blog3 that China would soon revalue its currency. Specifically, I argued that China would revalue the peg to the U.S. dollar (by a small amount close to 3%-5% rather than a larger 10%-15% move), that it would move from the peg to the U.S. dollar to a basket peg and that it would create a fluctuation band around this basket. That is indeed what happened today even if the size of the revaluation -- 2.1% -- is somewhat smaller than what I and most would have predicted; also, the band around the basket is still very narrow (plus or minus 0.3%).
In many dimensions, the move is too small: It is too small to make a dent on the Chinese trade surplus or on the U.S.-China bilateral trade balance; also, the move won't appease those in Congress who want to pass protectionist legislation against China; finally, in the short run, the move may lead to even more speculative capital inflows into China from investors who will bet on further Chinese revaluation.
Still, this is a significant change in the Chinese currency regime, as it is the first step of a much wider currency move over time in China and in the rest of Asia that will have important repercussions over the medium term. In the short run, there will be massive speculative pressures on other Asian currencies to appreciate -- as the impact appreciation of the yen today shows -- as other Asian currencies will be proxy plays for further Chinese currency moves. Also, the Chinese move allows other Asian authorities to let their currencies appreciate somehow without being as concerned about loss of competitiveness with China. The more China will let its currency move over time, the larger will be the appreciation of other Asian currencies.
China changed its peg today given the external U.S. pressure and the domestic need to cool down the Chinese economy, as the overheating was leading to serious financial imbalances (see my China Trip Report7 for more details). But since the Chinese authorities are conservative and concerned about the economic impact of a larger move, as expected, they made a very modest and cautious move.
But this small move is a beginning of a much larger currency regime change in China and Asia. It may be the beginning of the unraveling of the so-called Bretton Woods 2 regime8, a regime that has allowed until now the cheap financing of the U.S. "twin" deficits (budget and trade). And, indeed, this morning the U.S. Treasury market reacted to this move by pushing the 10-year Treasury yield up by 0.07 percentage point. Over time, the more China and Asia move and the more they reduce their forex intervention and accumulation of U.S. dollar assets and U.S. Treasuries, the larger the impact on U.S. interest rates will become, as such intervention has been an important factor in keeping U.S. long rates low.
In the past I warned against biting the hand that feeds you9 as the U.S. was aggressively pushing for a large Chinese revaluation while, at the same time, needing such Chinese and Asian cheap financing of its twin deficits. If a modest 2.1% currency move increases U.S. long rates by 0.07 percentage points, consider the implication of a 15%-20% move in currency values in China and Asia over time. It could get ugly for the U.S. unless the U.S. seriously tackles its fiscal deficit (by reversing some of its unsustainable tax cuts) and its large and growing current-account deficit.
* * *
11:38 a.m. EDT
David Altig writes: Nouriel, not surprisingly, puts his finger on one of the key issues: How close is the new yuan-dollar exchange rate to the value it would take if allowed to float freely? In other words, how many shoes are yet to drop?
My colleagues Owen Humpage10 and Pat Higgins have done some interesting calculations that are slated to appear in a forthcoming Cleveland Fed publication. They find that, although the Chinese central bank has increased the pace of foreign exchange reserves over the past year, much of this activity has been "sterilized." Roughly speaking, while the Chinese central bank has been increasing the supply of money to accumulate dollar assets on the one hand, they have at the same time been engaging in domestic operations to reabsorb that liquidity with the other hand. The end result has been that the pace of money creation in China -- monetary base growth, specifically -- has not been accelerating, even as the central bank has appeared to intervene more and more to sustain the peg.
Why is this interesting? Because, again roughly speaking, sterilized exchange rate operations have no effect on the value of the currency, outside of a short window of time. That the Chinese central bank has been fairly successful at maintaining its target while sterilizing a good portion (about half) of its interventions may mean either of two things. One possibility is that the value of the Chinese currency hasn't been, and so isn't now, as far away from its "fundamental" value as many people think. The second possibility is that the Chinese fixed exchange rate regime has been held together by the chewing-gum-and-chicken-wire device of capital controls.
The latter possibility means that the announcement that China plans to loosen capital controls -- presciently blogged by William Polley11 a few days ago -- is at least as big a story as today's announcement. On that proposition, I bet Nouriel and I agree.
* * *
12:20 p.m. EDT
Nouriel writes: David, correctly, points out the role of sterilized intervention in China. One of the reasons China decided to change its currency regime is that this intervention was leading to two serious financial costs and vulnerabilities for China:
1. Piling up more and more U.S. dollar foreign exchange reserves would lead to severe capital losses for China -- i.e., the change in the value of its dollar reserves when converted into local currency -- once the Chinese currency was allowed to appreciate. With more than $700 billion of foreign exchange reserves today (out of which most likely more than $500 billion are in U.S. dollars), a 10% move of the Chinese currency implies capital losses of $50 billion, a massive loss for a country like China. Not moving the peg would have implied intervening and accumulating even more forex reserves over time -- to the tune of over $200 billion a year lately -- and thus even larger capital losses for China down the line. Essentially, China and the rest of the Asian economies were getting tired of accumulating U.S. dollar reserves on which they knew that they would eventually suffer larger massive currency valuation capital losses.
2. The forex intervention has been -- as suggested by David -- only partially sterilized (only 50% of it lately) as it has become increasingly difficult for China to issue local currency bonds to mop up the monetary liquidity created by such intervention. This increase in the Chinese monetary base has led to excessive liquidity creation in China, feeding the credit boom and the investment boom and the real-estate bubble that have all exacerbated the financial vulnerabilities of the Chinese economy and increased the risk of a hard landing for China12. Thus, the currency move today is the beginning of a process that, over time, will allow China to reduce its forex intervention and, thus, reduce an accumulation of reserves that has been feeding the severe financial bubbles of its economy. But, paradoxically, in the short run a small move of 2.1% will only lead to even more speculative capital inflows into China and will thus trigger the need to accumulate even more reserves to prevent the currency value from breaching the new band.
As for the loosening of the capital controls, such liberalization will not -- in the short run -- lead to significant capital outflow out of China and prevent appreciation pressures. The reason is as follows: With the currency move today there is now a greater likelihood that the Chinese currency will further appreciate over time. Thus, international traders and investors, Chinese expat communities in Asia and foreign firms doing investments and FDI in China will have an even greater incentive to bring capital into China to obtain large capital gains once the Chinese currency moves even further. So, liberalization of capital outflows won't help in the short run, as capital is going only one way today, into China rather than out of China!
And this could really be the beginning of the end13 of the Bretton Woods 2 regime of fixed pegs to the U.S. dollar in Asia. Malaysia already decided today14 to drop its peg relative to the U.S. dollar. This China move may also force Hong Kong to phase out its long term currency board and U.S. dollar peg. And other Asian currencies will soon sharply appreciate15, following the yen's lead today. Even currencies at the periphery of this Bretton Woods regime (such as those in Latin America) may sharply appreciate16. The systemic consequences of this currency realignment throughout Asia and the world could be radical and have significant impacts on U.S. long-term interest rates, on U.S. financial markets and on the U.S housing bubble17.
* * *
2:10 p.m. EDT
David writes: I remain less convinced than Nouriel that we have a firm notion of how much further the Chinese currency will appreciate or how much effect liberalization of capital controls will have on exchange-rate dynamics. We simply don't know how private decision-makers in China will respond when offered the opportunity to freely move their own financial capital about the world. I don't find it at all implausible that private accumulation of dollar assets could put a pretty good dent in whatever reduction we see from the central bank.
I am going to stick with Ben Bernanke's position18 (or my version of it): The really important question is whether, when the dust settles, the Asian taste for saving outside of Asia will persist. If it does, it is hard to conjure up a scenario in which a good fraction of that saving won't continue to flow in the direction of the U.S. If it doesn't, there probably isn't enough that can be done via fiscal deficit reduction to stave off the effects on the U.S. economy that Nouriel fears. (I guess that Nouriel is not much convinced by the recent good news19 on that front!)
I have long agreed with Nouriel that the probable impact of a change like today's will be some upward pressure on U.S. interest rates. And yes, that will likely rebound to the detriment of the interest-sensitive sectors that have benefited from the long (and unexpected) spell of low interest rates that has been around for several years now. But the market, today at any rate, has responded in a fairly orderly manner, and I simply don't see the argument yet that clearly suggests the adjustment-road ahead will be all that much rougher.
* * *
3:20 p.m. EDT
Nouriel writes: I beg to disagree. If China were to liberalize its capital account regime -- on capital inflows as much as on capital outflows -- and stop intervening, the Chinese currency could appreciate by more than 20%, minimum. Think of it: China has a current-account surplus that is now growing to more than 4-5% of its GDP; it also has long-term capital inflows in the form of FDI that are another 2-3% of GDP; and on top this, last year it had hot money capital inflows that were another 5% of its GDP. Each one of these three forces leads to a currency appreciation; and this is why China was forced last year to intervene to the tune of $200 billion in forex-reserve accumulation to prevent the yuan from appreciating. Given today's move, liberalizing the capital account would increase the capital inflows as investors are now expecting further appreciation of the Chinese currency (see the wise blog comments by Brad Setser on this today20); thus, it would not lead to any meaningful capital outflows.
And, indeed, in preparation for the move today, China tightened -- rather than loosened -- its controls on capital inflows to try to stem the onslaught of speculative capital that is now going to rush into China to profit from further expected appreciation. So, there is only one direction that the yuan can go if intervention is reduced and capital controls are eased: up!
The hard part for China and the rest of Asia will be now to manage the massive speculative inflows of capital that are betting on further appreciations of the yuan and other Asian currencies. As the extensive coverage today of the news and blogosphere comments on the China move on my RGE Monitor21 suggest, markets are now expecting that China will now allow further upward movements of the yuan and of other Asian currencies: Malaysia already dropped the towel and abandoned its peg today; soon, Hong Kong's currency board will undergo serious pressure, and a range of currencies in Asia and around the world are strengthening. It should also be noted that, while China moved its peg by only 2.1%, the official announcement22 left significant ambiguity on whether it will allow its central parity relative to its undisclosed basket to move further on a daily basis. So, it is reasonable to expect that, over the next few months, China will allow a 10% appreciation or more of its currency relative to such a basket.
As for the impact on the U.S., this depends on the factors that have caused the bond conundrum. Unless one believes -- a la Bernanke -- that such a conundrum is explained only by a persistent global savings glut, the impact of this change in currency regime in China and Asia on the U.S. financial markets could be serious. The effect of Chinese and Asian intervention on U.S. long rates is hard to measure but estimates range between 0.5 and 1.5 percentage points.
But the general equilibrium effects of such forex intervention -- or its reduction after a significant 10-15% currency move in China and Asia -- could be much larger than the direct effects as:
1. Chinese/Asian savings rates are high and consumption rates are low because undervalued currencies make imports expensive and thus dampen domestic consumption;
2. If China/Asia moves, Asian private investors who were willing to hold and accumulate large stocks of U.S. dollar assets under the assumption that their currencies would remain stable relative to the U.S. dollar will now face large capital losses on their holdings of U.S. dollar assets and will thus be less willing to hold them;
3. A sharp movement downward of the U.S. dollar relative to Asian currencies would -- over time -- increase U.S. inflation and induce the Fed to tighten more than it would have otherwise; such further increase in U.S. short rates would contribute to increase U.S. long rates.
So, while I agree with David that a sharp reduction in the Asian and world appetite for the U.S. assets would be painful for the U.S. even if the U.S were to make a significant fiscal adjustment, the lack of such fiscal adjustment would inflict greater pain than otherwise. And I indeed do believe that the recent improvement of the U.S. fiscal balance will be totally temporary. In fact, official CBO forecasts23 suggest that, if all the tax cuts are made permanent (income tax cuts, dividend tax cuts, capital gains tax cuts, repeal of estate taxes, full fixing of the alternative minimum tax), the U.S. fiscal deficit could surge to be as high as $500-600 billion by 2009 (see my recent blog on the reemergence of Voodoo Economics24).
We live in a fragile world with geostrategic risks on the rise (terrorism, North Korea, Iran, political and potential supply shocks in oil exporting countries), large and growing global current-account imbalances, asset bubbles in bond and housing markets, and froth in financial markets where leverage, carry trades and excessive risk taking are on the rise. This is a fragile disequilibrium for the global economy. The Chinese move today signals that China -- and soon Asia -- may be willing to start doing its share of an orderly global rebalancing (as the small move today is a signal of much larger currency moves in the future). We will see if the U.S. is also willing to step up to the plate and do its share by reducing its structural fiscal deficit with structural measures (reversing some of the unsustainable tax cuts) and dealing with its financial froth before it is too late. If that doesn't happen, the risk of a hard landing of the U.S. and global economy significantly increases.
* * *
4:30 p.m. EDT
David writes: Wow! Nouriel always has a good story to tell, and tells it well. But there are a lot of "all else equals" in the tale. In essence, I'm not so much disagreeing with him as much as cautioning that the web of effects that may arise from broad financial reforms are so complex that I wouldn't place very big bets on any particular outcome.
Well, OK, when it gets right down to it, I am disagreeing. In the overall scheme of things, if you put any faith at all in markets' ability to provide best guesses of such things, the expected magnitude of RMB-appreciation looks pretty moderate. By the last update I received, non-deliverable forward foreign exchange contracts were suggesting a total appreciation of about 8% over the next twelve months. That includes the 2% today. This is up a bit from yesterday, when 6% was the bet, but it still doesn't add up to great drama.
This may not, of course, reflect where the Chinese currency will end up over the longer horizon, or where events would force the central bank in the event of any particular configuration of reforms. But it does indicate where those with their money on the line see the process heading, given what is actually likely to occur. Which is really to emphasize another point I have often made: It is in the interest of the Chinese central bank and the Chinese government to maintain a pace of reform that is consistent with an orderly transition to wherever we are headed. Thus far, this has certainly been the model (although I know Nouriel has the opinion that the road we are on will leave them, and us, with few options).
It is worthwhile to note that we have very little knowledge at this point about what this new regime actually amounts to, other than a small appreciation in the current exchange rate. The range of the "float" is essentially the same range that was, at least hypothetically, in operation prior to today's announcement. It may well be the case that the peg will be managed less severely now, but plus or minus 0.3 percentage points is still a pretty narrow corridor.
Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge we have no idea what this basket of currencies might be that will inform future decisions about the level of the dollar versus the RMB, or what will trigger reactions to changes in that value of that basket. In other words, it remains to be seem how much change this regime change actually amounts to.
One final point for this round. A nominal currency peg doesn't mean a real exchange rate peg, and it is the real exchange rate that drives the flow of real goods and services that we really care about. My emphasis on capital controls is in part driven by the fact that, over the longer haul, those sorts of controls can screw up the real exchange rate in ways that a purely nominal exchange peg won't. If the only change we see is another six percentage points on the nominal exchange rate, I just don't believe that the underlying real exchange rate implications will have any substantial near-term impact on our current-account deficit.
* * *
5:05 p.m. EDT
Nouriel writes: In my view the Chinese move today is the beginning of a much larger currency move in China and Asia. The Chinese are smart enough to know that a 2.1% move will have little effect on their trade balance,on their internal financial vulnerabilities, on the protectionist pressures in the U.S. Congress, and that such a small move will only increase speculative inflows into China. So, for them, this is the beginning of a much larger currency move that, over time, will lead to a managed float a la Singapore and to significant capital account liberalization.
I venture to guess that over the next 12 months, the Chinese currency will be allowed to appreciate by more than 10% and that other Asian currencies as well as other effective members of the "Bretton Woods 2" club around the world (including countries as far as India, Russia, Chile, Brazil, etc.) will also follow and allow their currencies to appreciate relative to the U.S. dollar. If this is the case, the system of "vendor financing"25 that has led to the large accumulation of U.S. dollar reserves by foreign central banks to the tune of over $500 billion a year may unravel: While central banks won't stop intervening, they may reduce their rate of forex intervention by significant amounts. Even a reduction of 50% in the rate of intervention would imply a foreign financing of the U.S. twin deficits of only $250 billion a year rather than $500 billion plus a year of recent times.
This would imply an unraveling of the Bretton Woods 2 regime and will force the U.S. to make significant and painful adjustments to its private and public savings droughts, droughts that much more than a global savings glut explain why the U.S. external balance has been worsening over time. Then, U.S. private spending, both consumption and investment, may have to fall sharply -- driven by higher U.S. interest rates and a bursting of the housing bubble -- relative to U.S. output to make room for an improvement of U.S. net exports.
And how much U.S. private spending may be squeezed will depend on whether there is a meaningful structural reduction in the U.S. fiscal imbalance. Less foreign financing of the U.S. external deficits would, for unchanged fiscal balance, tend to crowd out private consumption and private investment via higher interest rates. This U.S. adjustment could be painful26.
Finally, I am concerned about the financial consequences of an uncoordinated global rebalancing, where the lack of policy coordination between the U.S., China/Asia and Europe may lead to significant financial markets' volatility. There is now a huge incentive for hedge funds, prop desks and other highly leveraged institutions to try the Asian Currency Revaluation bet and go for a currency kill in Asia. You can expect massive capital inflows into all of the currencies of the effective Bretton Woods 2 regime as investors test the central banks' willingness to prevent sharp -- rather than small -- movements of their currencies. This may imply major short positions on the U.S. dollar and massive long positions on a wide range of currently semi-fixed or heavily managed currencies.
The stakes are so high that traders/investors may want to test how far they can collectively push such currencies and make significant capital gains on this speculative attack. Herding behavior and momentum trading are typical of financial markets, and the Chinese move today is a signal that it's open season on trying to push up a wide range of Asian and other currencies. This is why policy makers and regulators may want to be wary of systemic risks associated with such large capital flow movements. In 1998, Russia's currency crisis triggered the LTCM crisis and a 10% plus move of the Yen relative to the U.S dollar in a matter of three days. The financial debris from these sharp currency and financial assets swings was significant. This China currency move could similarly be a turning point for the currently stable -- but structurally highly unstable - disequilibrium in the U.S. and global economy. A disorderly global rebalancing can't be ruled out.
* * *
6:35 p.m. EDT
David writes: Nouriel says "policy makers and regulators may want to be wary of systemic risks associated with such large capital flow movements." There are certainly no truer words than those, and over time I have become convinced that the truly important work of central bankers is to handle those episodes when the feared meltdowns come a'calling. It is interesting, then, that Nouriel references the 1998 Russian/LTCM crisis, which was the back-breaking straw piled on the 1997 Asian currency crisis. If I had to choose one example of a case where severe stress in global financial markets was weathered just fine, that would be a good candidate.
Now, Nouriel might argue that things were not so hot for those countries whose currencies were under attack, and this time around that country is us (as in U.S.). Here we reach an impasse, because I just don't buy it. The fundamentals of the U.S. economy just look too strong and, as I just happened to be blogging about yesterday27, I continue to read our large current-account "imbalance" as being substantially driven by external factors, rather than homegrown malfeasance.
For sure, it is not an easy task to defend our fiscal deficits without reservation. But a few points are in order. First, relative to GDP, they really aren't that large. Second, though you might argue that the real problems have to do with the long-term status of Social Security, Medicare, and the like, those problems were with us before the Bush tax cuts and certainly during the allegedly-halcyon surplus days of the late '90s (as documented here28, for example). And they are not going to be fixed by simply repealing those tax cuts that Nouriel doesn't like.
None of this is to claim that it's time to fall asleep at the wheel. Nor is it to claim that there aren't some tough adjustments ahead. We may well be at the beginning of an upward climb in long-term interest rates that many of us have long expected, and the reversal of the current-account deficits that all of us knew would come sooner or later. And though I am not much convinced by Nouriel's worst-case scenarios, I'm glad he's out there reminding us to not forget about them.


Thursday, July 21, 2005

國家資訊中心:軟著陸已實現 通縮趨勢仍需預防

By 經濟預測部首席經濟師祝寶良

從主要經濟統計指標看,今年上半年經濟形勢撲朔迷離,一方面,今年上半年,國內生產總值增長9.5%,增速與2003-2004年持平,繼續維持較高的增長速度,第二季度經濟增速達到9.5%,高於第一季度的9.4%;但另一方面市場物價走低,部分工業消費品價格不斷下跌。一方面,工業快速增長、工業產品銷售率提高;另一方面工業企業盈利水準下降,虧損額增加。面對這一複雜的局面,對中國經濟的下一步走向,經濟界出現了“硬著陸”和“軟著陸”兩種不同的判斷。
我們認為,在宏觀調控政策的引導下,今年中國經濟將在經過近三年的擴張后,平穩地回落到8%-9%的適度增長區間,出現高增長、低通脹的態勢,即出現所謂的“軟著陸”。當前,應繼續保持穩健的貨幣政策和財政政策,並透過“雙穩健政策”和產業政策的配合,防止出現通貨緊縮的趨勢,使經濟繼續保持活力。
一、軟著陸成功
1、固定資產投資增速回落,投資結構明顯改善
中央對固定資產投資“有保有壓、區別對待”的政策得到較好落實。一方面,部分高耗能、高污染行業的投資低水準擴張勢頭得到抑制。鋼鐵、水泥、電解鋁等行業投資增速大幅下降。另一方面,煤電油運和農業等國民經濟薄弱環節的投資得到加強。1-6月,全社會固定資產投資比去年同期增長25.4%,增幅比去年同期下降3.2個百分點。其中,城鎮固定資產投資增長27.1%,回落3.9個百分點。在城鎮固定資產投資中,房地產開發投資增長23.5%,比去年同期回落5.2個百分點。煤炭開採及洗選業投資比去年同期增長81.7%,石油和天然氣開採增長36.2%,電力、燃氣及水的生產和供應業增長35.9%,鐵路建設增長48%。
但從月度來看,投資增速逐月呈小幅提高趨勢,前6個月,城鎮固定資產投資累計增速分別比上月提高0.8、0.4、0.7和0.7個百分點。投資增幅逐月加快與去年同期落幅大有很大關係,去年一季度,城鎮固定資產投資增長47.8%,為此國家採取了一系列措施抑制投資過快增長,到6月份,城鎮固定資產投資增幅降至31%。如果扣除去年基數因素的話,今年1-5月份,投資是逐月回落的,6月份投資略有反彈與當月銀行貸款增加有直接的關係。但總的看,投資增速依然偏高,仍偏離了15-20%的適度增長區間。
2、消費需求穩步增長,農村市場走出低迷
今年以來消費需求延續去年後期快速增長的勢頭,1-6月累計消費品零售總額同比增長13.2%,比去年同期提高0.4個百分點。扣除物價因素,實際增長12%,比去年同期加速1.8個百分點,增幅屬近年較快水準,社會消費品零售額對經濟增長的貢獻度提高0.7個百分點。農村市場走出低迷,城鄉居民消費增幅呈現縮小的趨勢。縣及縣以下消費品零售額增長11.1%,與城市消費品零售額增長14.2%相比相差3個百分點,差距比去年同期縮小1.9個百分點,比去年全年縮小1個百分點。消費增長較快的原因有以下幾個,一是去年以來,全國提高了最低工資標準、最低生活水準標準,工資水準因此提高;二是2002年以來,企業利潤增加較快,個人收入有所增加;三是中央加大對農業的投入和直接補貼,清理拖欠農民工工資,農民收入提高。
3、出口大幅度增長,進口減慢
在拉動宏觀經濟的“三駕馬車”中,凈出口發揮了較大的作用。今年上半年,出口3423.4億美元,增速32.7%,增幅與上年同期回落3個百分點;進口3026.9億美元,增長14%,增幅比上年同期回落28.6個百分點,進口下降態勢明顯,其中,一般貿易進口1310億美元,僅增長7%;貿易順差達到396.5億美元,而去年同期貿易逆差為68.2億美元。今年上半年,凈出口拉動經濟增長5.9個百分點,而去年同期對經濟增長的貢獻為-1.7個百分點。出口之所以如此快速增長,原因在於2004年下半年開始美元出現了貶值,人民幣釘住美元使人民幣跟隨美元一起對世界其他的主要貨幣貶值,刺激了我國出口快速增長。而投資增速減慢是影響進口減慢的主要原因。
4、居民消費價格漲勢趨穩,生產資料和房地產價格漲幅有所回落
針對去年居民消費價格上漲的主要帶動因素,中央從增加農產品供給和適當管制服務價格入手,成功地控制了物價上漲過快的勢頭。今年以來,中央繼續加大對農業的政策支持力度,調動了農民生產積極性,糧食播種面積進一步增加,夏糧生產獲得豐收。今年上半年,食品價格同比上漲4.4%,增幅同比回落21.3個百分點,帶動居民消費價格漲幅明顯回落,居民消費價格總水準上漲2.3%,低於去年同期3.6%的水準。值得注意的是,不包括食品在內的居民消費價格上漲0.8個百分點,比2004年提高0.2個百分點。
生產資料價格回落。上半年,流通環節的生產資料價格上漲5.6%,比上年末回落8.5個百分點。6月份鋼材價格出現比較明顯的下跌,再加上部分化工產品市場價格的回落,導致6月份生產資料市場價格總水準繼5月份環比回落1個百分點後,繼續回落1.5個百分點,回落幅度加大。生產資料價格漲幅回落,顯示出自2003年以來,我國生產資料供不應求的狀況趨向好轉。但上半年原材料、燃料、動力購進價格上漲9.9%,仍維持在較高水準上。
今年以來,中央從供給和需求兩方面加強了對房地產市場的調控。溫家寶總理在《政府工作報告》中提出“抑制房地產價格過快上漲”,將房價列為穩定價格的兩個調控重點之一。5月11日,建設部、發改委等7部委聯合發佈《關於做好穩定住房價格工作的意見》。今年上半年,各地政府紛紛加大了對經濟適用房和中低價商品房的供地力度,出臺了限制投機炒房的相關政策。有關政策出臺後,改變了市場心理預期,市場觀望氣氛上升,部分地區商品房成交量增長放緩。
市場需求降溫使全國商品房銷售價格漲幅已經開始小幅回落。1-5月,全國商品房平均銷售價格同比上漲8.9%,比1-3月和1-4月的漲幅下降了3.6個百分點。其中,1-5月份商品住宅平均銷售價格上漲11.3%,比1-3月和1-4月的漲幅分別下降了2.2個和2.3個百分點。國家發展改革委、國家統計局對35個大中城市調查也顯示,二季度35個大中城市房屋銷售價格同比上漲8.0%,比一季度上漲1.5%,同比和環比漲幅分別比一季度回落1.8和1.2個百分點。


5、工業生產穩中趨降,企業經濟效益有所下降
工業生產穩中趨降,上半年,全部國有工業企業及年產品銷售收入500萬元以上的非國有工業完成增加值同比增長16.4%,增速同比減緩1.3個百分點。隨著固定資產投資增速放緩,重工業增長率從去年上半年的19.7%快速回落到今年同期的16.9%,增幅下降2.9個百分點。而消費和出口的穩定增長帶動輕工業增長15.4%,增幅和去年同期基本持平。
在工業增長放慢的同時,工業企業效益明顯下降。今年1-5月份,全國規模以上工業企業實現利潤4968億元,比去年同期增長15.8%。增幅同比回落27.9個百分點。在39個工業大類中,煤炭、石油、黑色金屬礦、有色金屬礦、非金屬礦等採礦業利潤同比分別增長88%、71.8%、35.6%、149.7%、51.6%;石油加工及煉焦業全行業虧損,1-5月份凈虧損10.3億元;化工行業增長26.4%;化纖行業下降44.4%;交通運輸設備製造業下降48%;建材行業下降31.3%;電力行業下降18.8%;電子通信行業下降7.3%;鋼鐵行業增長29.8%。電解鋁、水泥等行業出現全行業虧損。規模以上工業虧損企業虧損額917億元,同比增長56.1%,增幅同比提高55.7個百分點。其中,國有及國有控股虧損企業虧損額465億元,增長77.5%。企業效益開始從前三年的逐步好轉變為逐步惡化。
從對今年經濟形勢的分析可以看出,一方面,我國經濟仍處於高增長、低通脹的良好狀態,經濟結構有所改善,投資與消費的運行更趨協調,重工業與輕工業增速差距縮小。但另一方面,我國經濟增長的峰值已經過去,經濟進入回落期。這主要表現在價格水準回落和一般貿易進口下降上。物價相對經濟增長是滯後指標,在我國,價格相對於經濟增長存在約1年的滯後期,也就是說在經濟擴張一年左右後,物價開始低位上漲;經濟收縮約一年左右後,物價會達到峰期,物價水準回落說明經濟的擴張期在2004年年中已經結束。我國一般貿易進口主要是國內需要的能源、原材料和投資設備等,一般進口減慢是國內投資需求下降的重要表現。
二、尚不會出現通貨緊縮
總體上看,由於佔固定資產比重較大的房地產行業受到宏觀調控的控制,出口受外界因素制約,下半年宏觀經濟將走低,但尚不會出現通貨緊縮。預計下半年,我國經濟速度在9%左右,居民消費價格上漲2%左右。
1、房地產調控帶動固定資產投資進入下降通道
宏觀調控和微觀主體自主性調整會引致投資增速下降。一是佔固定資產投資比重最大的房地產投資回落將是主導原因。房地產是國民經濟的支柱產業,對經濟具有較大的拉動作用,首先,房地產在固定資產投資中的比重高,權重為25%左右。其次,房地產直接帶動鋼鐵、水泥、有色金屬等行業,並帶動這些行業輻射到其他更多行業,推動固定投資的增長。再次,地方政府的城市建設資金來源於房地產行業帶動的土地拍賣,如果房地產市場興盛,則地方政府從土地拍賣中獲益豐厚,相關的城市建設資金充足,對整個固定投資的推動效應也就大。因此,只要有效地控制房地產的投資,就會抑制投資的過快增長。隨著國家一系列調控房地產業政策的逐步顯效,房地產投資增幅會繼續穩中趨降。
二是寬貨幣、緊信貸的局面難以改變。今年1-5月份,在廣義貨幣供應量(M2)增長速度維持在14.6%左右的情況下,金融機構各項人民幣貸款增長速度逐月回落,到2005年5月末,貸款增長速度由2004年年末的14.5%下降到12.4%,1-5月份,中長期貸款增加4408億元,同比少增1251億元。6月份,貨幣信貸增速明顯回升,6月末廣義貨幣供應量同比增長15.7%,6月當月,人民幣貸款增加4653億元,同比多增加1832億元,使6月末的人民幣貸款餘額增長13.3%,增幅比5月末提高了0.9個百分點。但貸款增速出現上揚主要是短期貸款和票據融資增加,銀行對用於投資的長期貸款仍比較謹慎,難以支撐投資的反彈。從下半年看,受資本充足率的約束,銀行慎貸行為不可能根本改變,去年下半年以來的信貸政策緊縮性操作也將對今年下半年固定資產投資增長產生抑制效應。
三是土地政策對固定資產投資的抑製作用繼續顯效。從房地產土地購置面積看,今年1-5月房地產土地購置面積僅增長了3.7%,比去年同期9.8%下降6.1個百分點,比2003年同期56.7%下降53個百分點。今年,農用地轉建設用地計劃為400萬畝,而各地申請建設用地達到1200萬畝。在土地政策約束下,投資增長將繼續降溫。
四是企業效益下降,企業生產和企業自有資金投資會明顯減慢。隨著2003年以來新一輪投資形成的生產能力陸續投產,產能不斷釋放,供給能力持續增加,企業效益必然進一步下降,企業生產擴張勢頭將逐步減緩。企業自籌資金投資佔我國總投資資金來源的60%以上,而企業自籌的資金主要是企業的利潤。企業利潤和效益下降,企業自有資金減少,投資能力和投資意願必然下降,並導致企業投資自主性和內生性收縮。
但地方政府發展經濟、增加投資的衝動依然很強;全國施工項目和新開工項目總投資規模高達14萬億元,相當於兩年的投資總額,因此投資增速不會出現大幅度回落,預計下半年,城鎮固定資產投資增速將維持在20%左右。
2、美元升值和人民幣匯率壓力制約出口增長
今年二季度以來,由於美國經濟增勢強勁、歐洲經濟疲軟、《歐洲憲法條約》未能在法國和荷蘭透過等原因,美元對歐元出現了升值趨勢,人民幣兌歐元、日元等也隨美元出現升值。貨幣升值與出口減慢在我國有3-6個月滯後期,當前的美元升值對三四季度的出口將帶來不利影響。
人民幣匯率壓力引發國際貿易衝突,同樣制約出口。最近,中美、中歐之間貿易衝突不斷。如果中國對國際輿論漠然視之,繼續堅持謹慎而又保守的匯率制度,必將激怒貿易夥伴。雖然,我國與歐盟最終達成了協議,但協議還是對我國紡織品出口設置了限制;中美貿易爭端可能具有更大的不確定性,結局卻很明確,就是中國出口受到限制。如果人民幣升值,也會抑制出口。
此外,去年1-8月,我國對外貿易是逆差,但從9月份以來,出口增速加快,進口減慢,2004年9-12月四個月就是實現順差330億美元。去年下半年出口和凈出口基數高會影響出口和凈出口的增長速度。
在如此劇烈的貿易衝突以及今年二季度美元對歐元升值11%的情況下,我國出口不會繼續延續2004年以來高增長的趨勢。在人民幣兌美元匯率保持穩定的前提下,下半年,出口將增長20%左右,進口增長17%左右,貿易順差約400億美元,凈出口對下半年GDP增長的拉動作用將明顯減弱。
3、消費依然樂觀
從2004年下半年開始,社會消費品零售額明顯擺脫了長期9-10%的增長趨勢,進入12-13%的區間,反映了消費有所啟動。從長期來看,社會消費品零售額增速進入13%區間不是短期性的。理由是,改革開放後出世的一代人目前逐漸走上工作崗位,開始擁有獨立的支配收入能力,其相對富裕的家庭背景及和父母不同的消費觀念可能帶來中國消費的逐漸啟動,這點有類似於美國戰後的“嬰兒潮”。下半年,社會消費品零售額增速在13-13.5%之間,對比與固定投資和出口,“三駕馬車”中的消費是目前最值得樂觀的因素,可能繼續在下半年的宏觀經濟增長中充當主要因素。
4、CPI回落趨勢確定,服務價格成主導
食品是居民消費價格中最大的部分。從目前的生產形勢來看,2005年夏糧生產將獲得豐收,此外,當前中國的糧食庫存充裕,庫存與消費比在30%以上,遠高於聯合國糧農組織規定的18%安全水準,糧食價格就幾乎不可能再次大幅攀升。同時,國家採取的糧食保護收購政策又對糧食價格形成支撐,其下跌空間有限。我國公用事業產品和部分服務價格不是市場化的,其價格受國家的嚴格控制,正因為如此,國家會根據市場價格水準的高低擇機調整公用事業產品和服務業價格的價格,主導下半年居民消費價格走勢的將是公用事業產品和服務價格。國際原油價格大幅上漲也會推升價格上漲。當然,由於我國工業消費品生產能力相對過剩的情形仍然相當嚴重,服裝、紡織品、家用電器、辦公用品、日用品等工業消費品價格一直延續著1998年以來的下跌趨勢。但總的看,當前還不會出現通貨緊縮。
三、生產能力過剩與升值壓力增大
儘管今年我國經濟不會出現通貨緊縮的局面,但影響經濟進一步下滑和價格繼續走低的因素值得關注。
1、工業消費品生產能力過剩的情形仍然相當嚴重
今年上半年,消費市場需求較為旺盛。但是,在統計商品零售價格指數的16類商品中,除了食品、飲料煙酒、金銀珠寶、書報雜誌、燃料、建材五金等6類商品的價格和去年同期持平或上升外,其他製造業產品包括服裝、紡織品、家用電器、辦公用品、日用品等10類商品的價格仍然延續著1998年以來下跌趨勢。在市場需求旺盛並且能源、原材料等上游產品的價格已經上漲多年的情況下,這10類製造業商品價格依然下跌,說明我國國民經濟中生產能力過剩的情形仍然相當嚴重。
2、人民幣升值的壓力仍然存在
2004年我國外匯儲備猛增2067億美元,其中一半的新增外匯儲備在最後三個月形成;在外匯儲備增加額中,經常項目約佔700億美元,資本和金融項目約佔1120億美元。在資本和金融項目中實際使用外商直接投資606億美元,其餘的大多為“熱錢”。由於預期人民幣升值的投機因素也表現在“熱錢”繼續流入我國,上半年,實際使用外商直接投資金額285億美元,加上貿易順差396億美元,兩項相加才681億美元,但到6月底外匯儲備達到7110億美元,1-6月份,新增外匯儲備1010億美元,多出的330億美元,皆來自於具有“熱錢”性質的境內金融機構減少國外資產運作將資金調回境內,或增加國外短期借款,或來自於居民將手持外幣兌換成人民幣。
人民幣一旦升值,短期內對國民經濟會造成較大不利影響。人民幣升值後,在其他條件不變的情況下,一方面,出口產品的美元價格會上升,削弱我國出口產品競爭力,降低國外對我國產品的需求;另一方面,進口產品人民幣價格會下降,相應增加了國內對進口產品的需求;此外,人民幣升值造成出口需求下降使國內生產總值增長率放緩,會減少對進口的需求。人民幣升值後,能源、原材料、機器設備等進口產品價格降低,國內相應產品價格也會降低,企業投資成本下降,在經濟比較景氣的狀態下,企業投資意願有可能增強;同時,國內價格水準下降以及出口減緩,也會擠壓企業的盈利空間,削弱企業投資意願。當前國內消費品市場基本處於供過於求的狀態,人民幣升值帶來的進口消費品價格下跌雖有利於消費增加,但影響有限。而且,受出口減慢、新增就業減少的影響,居民收入增速會有所下降,不利於消費增加,因此,人民幣升值對消費也將產生一定負面影響。綜合考慮三大需求因素,透過宏觀計量經濟模型的測算,若人民幣升值5%,國內生產總值增速下降1.4個百分點,居民消費價格指數下跌1.2個百分點。因此,如果目前大幅度調整匯率水準,不排除我國經濟出現通貨緊縮的可能性。
四、保持宏觀調控政策的穩定性
從拉動經濟增長的“三駕馬車”的分析看,自2002年年底開始的我國新一輪經濟週期的擴張期峰值已過,宏觀經濟運行進入緩慢收縮階段。為此有以下政策建議:
1、穩定當前的宏觀經濟政策
當前,政府宏觀調控政策不應再加大力度,對國內需求的宏觀調控,主要任務已經不是繼續“削峰”,而是透過“雙穩健政策”和產業政策的配合,防止出現通貨緊縮的趨勢,引導內需在適當的增長平臺上穩定運行,使經濟繼續保持活力。在繼續管好土地和信貸兩個“閘門”的同時,在貨幣政策的調控手段上,應靈活運用信貸規模和利率調控的“鬆緊搭配”,適度減輕信貸供給從緊力度,充分利用價格型貨幣工具,使經濟主體在價格信號引導下,自主調整投資需求,保持經濟的適度增長。
2、加快人民幣匯率形成機制改革
從長期看,必須改變外匯儲備增長過快的狀況,恢復經濟增長、物價穩定、充分就業和國際收支平衡之間的內在均衡關係,但當前不宜過大調整人民幣的匯率水準。應著眼於加快改革人民幣匯率形成機制的進程,建議對經常項目首先實行意願結售匯制度,增強企業用匯的自主權。健全和完善外匯市場,主要從增加市場交易主體、外匯市場交易品種、加快推行遠期衍生外匯交易、發展健全商業銀行做市商制度為主體的外匯交易方式等方面著手。加快推出外匯市場風險管理工具,為企業應對匯率波動提供可行的避險工具。
3、謹慎把握房地產市場的調控力度
在我國證券市場行情低迷的情況下,投機人民幣升值的國際遊資在我國的主要投機對象是部分熱點城市的房地產市場。抑制房地產泡沫有助於壓縮國際遊資投機空間。要充分考慮房地產業的產業關聯度強的特點,在國內需求已經轉入穩定增長階段後,要透過房地產景氣的穩定來帶動整體經濟的穩定。在最近出臺了一系列調控房地產市場的新政策措施後,要冷靜觀察市場變化。除了已出臺的有關限制二手房交易的“堵”的政策而外,下一步更要落實好“疏”的措施,包括加大經濟適用房、中低檔商品房、政府廉租房等的供給力度,改善房地產供給結構,使廣大老百姓住得起房。由於供給結構的調整需要較長一段時間,因此,對房地產市場的調控效果不能急於求成。